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The broad construct of empathy incorporates both cognitive and affective dimensions.
Recent evidence suggests that the subjects with autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) show a
signiﬁcant impairment in empathic ability.The aimof this studywas to evaluate the cognitive
and affective components of empathy in adolescents with ASD compared to controls.
Fifteen adolescents with ASD and 15 controls underwent paper and pencil measures and a
computerized Multifaceted EmpathyTest. All measures were divided into mentalizing and
experience sharing abilities. Adolescents with ASD compared to controls showed deﬁcits
in all mentalizing measures: they were incapable of interpreting and understanding the
mental and emotional states of other people. Instead, in the sharing experience measures,
the adolescents with ASD were able to empathize with the emotional experience of other
peoplewhen they express emotionswith positive valence, but were not able to do sowhen
the emotional valence is negative.These results were conﬁrmed by the computerized task.
In conclusion, our results suggest that adolescents with ASD show a difﬁculty in cognitive
empathy, whereas the deﬁcit in affective empathy is speciﬁc for the negative emotional
valence.
Keywords: adolescents, autistic spectrum disorder (ASD), affective empathy, cognitive empathy, experience
sharing, mentalizing
INTRODUCTION
Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) is a triad of qualitative impair-
ments in social interaction, communication and restricted, repeti-
tive, and stereotyped behaviors (American PsychiatricAssociation,
2000). An important feature of the proposed criteria in DSM-5
for ASD is a change from three (autistic triad) to two domains:
“social/communication deﬁcits” and “ﬁxated and repetitive pat-
tern of behavior” (Wilkinson, 2012). These difﬁculties often make
it very hard for people with ASD to be successful members
of society and can present very serious challenges to parents,
teachers, and other professionals. Major difﬁculties in social inter-
action have been a deﬁning feature of individuals with autism
(Fletcher-Watson et al., 2014).
People with ASD often show an impaired comprehension
of other people’s mental states, such as thoughts, beliefs, and
intentions (Frith and Happé, 1994; Frith and Frith, 2003; Jones
et al., 2010; Gaigg, 2012; Schwenck et al., 2012). Recent stud-
ies showed that subjects with ASD have not only a difﬁculty
in attributing another person’s mental state but also in the
capacity to respond to another person’s mental state with an
appropriate emotion (Sucksmith et al., 2013). These abilities
seem to be involved in the multifaceted construct of empathy
(Zaki and Ochsner, 2012). In agreement with recent literature
(Jones et al., 2010; Baron-Cohen, 2011; Dziobek et al., 2011;
Schwenck et al., 2012; Zaki and Ochsner, 2012) empathy should
no longer be considered as a unitary concept, instead it comprises
at least two components (Singer, 2006; Decety and Meyer, 2008;
Dziobek et al., 2008). In fact, empathy includes the ability to
understand what others are thinking or feeling, without nec-
essarily “resonating” with that feeling state (cognitive empathy)
and the ability to emotionally “resonate” with other people’s feel-
ings while understanding that they are distinct from one’s own
(affective empathy; Jones et al., 2010; Schwenck et al., 2012).
The cognitive dimension of empathy requires complex cognitive
functions, including perspective-taking andmentalizing (Shamay-
Tsoory et al., 2002, 2009; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Zaki and Ochsner,
2012), whereas affective empathy includes experience sharing of
other persons’ internal states (Zaki andOchsner, 2012). Emotional
contagion is a precursor of affective empathy, whereby embodi-
ment entails the forming of a representation of the other person’s
feelings, and thereby sharing of their experience (Hadjikhani et al.,
2014).
Thus, mentalizing and experience sharing apparently rep-
resent two aspects of the same object, i.e., understanding
and responding to another person’s internal states, involv-
ing different mental systems. Mentalizing ability examines
the theory of mind (ToM) capacity by asking subjects to
draw explicit inferences about the mental states of other peo-
ple. Experience sharing is the tendency to take on, res-
onate with, or “share” the emotions of others and it is
often tied to a mechanism known as “internal resonance”
(Zaki and Ochsner, 2012).
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It is widely accepted that subjects with ASD do not pos-
sess a fully functioning ToM; even high functioning adults
with ASD may struggle with complex ToM tasks (Ponnet
et al., 2004; Fletcher-Watson et al., 2014). However, affective
impairments found in people with ASD are mainly related to
the cognitive recognition and processing of emotions, rather
than to the actual ability to feel emotional distress or con-
cern. The lack of a clear distinction between affective and
cognitive empathy has led to an incomplete understanding
of the empathic abilities of individuals with ASD. Interest-
ingly, a few studies have formally assessed empathy in indi-
viduals with autistic conditions (Dziobek et al., 2008; Jones
et al., 2010; Schwenck et al., 2012). Dziobek et al. (2008)
showed an impairment in cognitive empathy, but the presence
of normal empathetic concern (affective empathy) in adults
with Asperger syndrome (AS), based on self-report question-
naires such as the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980;
Rogers et al., 2007) and the Multifaceted Empathy Test (MET;
Dziobek et al., 2008).
Moreover, another two studies (Jones et al., 2010; Schwenck
et al., 2012) using only paper and pencil measures, have con-
ﬁrmed that ASD is characterized by difﬁculties in mentalizing
ability (cognitive empathy), but not with affective empathy
(Lockwood et al., 2013).
The study of social skills in adolescents with ASD is cru-
cial also for the construction of rehabilitation paradigms to
improve empathic capacities. For this reason, in this study
we investigated the empathic ability in adolescents with ASD
compared to controls, using both paper and pencil and
computerized measures, divided into mentalizing and experi-
ence sharing abilities in accordance with Zaki and Ochsner’s
(2012) model, to evaluate the presence of a dissociation
between cognitive and affective empathic abilities in this
population.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The study included 30 participants: 15 adolescents (11 boys and 4
girls,mean age ±SD: 15.11 ± 4.89 years) were affected byASD and
15 control subjects (10 boys and 5 girls; mean age = 16.50 ± 6.23),
were recruited to match the ASD group with respect to age and
education.
Autistic spectrum disorder participants were selected by the
ReferenceRegionalCentre forAutism,AbruzzoRegionHealth Sys-
tem, L’Aquila (Italy). TheASDdiagnosiswere given by experienced
clinicians according to the new criteria of the DSM-5 (Amer-
ican Psychiatric Association, 2013). ASD diagnosis of patients
was made with Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule, Second
Edition (ADOS-2; Lord et al., 2012).
Socio-demographic and clinical information of all the partic-
ipants are summarized in Table 1. The parents of adolescents
provided informed consent to participate in the study.
MENTALIZING MEASURES
First-order false belief test
This task was designed to elicit a response that demonstrated the
ability to make inferences about another individual’s mental state,
namely, that a character in the story holds a false belief. First order
false beliefs require a subject to make an inference about the state
of the world. To assess ﬁrst order ToM two stories were used: The
washing machine task (Rowe et al., 2001; Mazza et al., 2007) and
the Cigarettes Task (Happé, 1994).
Each subject obtained a score ranging from 0 to 1 for each
question. If the subject gave a correct answer to both the ﬁrst
order stories, s/he had a global score for ﬁrst order ToM equal to 2
(non-casual performance).
Advanced Theory of Mind Task
This task is an Italian adaptation of a cognitive task used by Blair
and Cipolotti (2000) and proposed in the literature by Happé
Table 1 | Socio-demographic, mentalizing, and sharing experience measure.
ASD (n = 15)
mean scores (SD)
Controls (n = 15)
means scores (SD)
t (df = 28) p
Age (years) 15.11 (4.89) 16.50 (6.23) −0.686 0.498
Gender 11 M, 4 F 10 M, 5 F
Education (years) 10.45 (2.55) 10.83 (1.85) −0.668 0.507
Raven’s matrices (in percentiles) 57.27 (26.96) 43.57 (22.30) 1.119 0.279
Mentalizing measures
AdvancedToM task 6.69 (4.15) 12.33 (0.77) −4.626 0.0001
BES cognitive subscale 29.27 (4.01) 39.83 (6.57) −5.154 0.0001
Sharing experience measures
Emotion attribution task 27.41 (11.67) 46.75 (10.21) −4.618 0.001
Positive emotions 7.57 (2.92) 9.42 (0.51) −2.149 0.068
Negative emotions 6.24 (1.59) 8.25 (1.81) −2.803 0.011
EyesTask 14.50 (8.25) 29.92 (8.62) −3.142 0.004
BES-affective subscale 30 (3.46) 32.17 (7.38) −7.38 0.322
Mean scores (and SDs) to the psychological tests separately for ASD and control subjects. The signiﬁcant results are highlighted by bold numbers.
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(1994). The task consists of a short version of 13 vignettes, each
accompanied by two questions; the comprehension question“Was
it true, what X said?,” and the justiﬁcation question“Why did X say
that?” The 13 story-types included Lie, White Lie, Joke, Pretend,
Misunderstanding, Double Bluff, and Contrary Emotion. Each
subject obtained a score ranging from 0 to 1 for each question.
The maximum score is 13.
Basic Empathy Scale–Cognitive Subscale
The Basic Empathy Scale (BES) comprises a total of 20 items
(Jolliffe and Farrington, 2006; Albiero et al., 2009). The cog-
nitive empathy subscale (CE subscale, nine items), measures
the ability to understand another person’s emotions. Each item
(e.g., “I can often understand how people are feeling even before
they tell me”) asks participants to express their own degree
of agreement on a 5-point, Likert-type scale, ranging from 1
(“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). The BES has demon-
strated a good validity (Jolliffe and Farrington, 2006; Albiero
et al., 2009). Cronbach’s a coefﬁcient was calculated to exam-
ine the internal consistency of the scale, considered globally
and in its two dimensions, as yielded by the conﬁrmatory fac-
tor analysis. The results showed satisfactory internal consistency
for both the scale and its subscales, given that the global scale
α coefﬁcient was 0.87 and cognitive subscale α values was 0.74
(Albiero et al., 2009).
EXPERIENCE SHARING MEASURES
The Eyes Task is a revised version of the “Reading the Mind
in the Eyes Test” (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). In brief, partic-
ipants are given 36 photographs depicting the ocular area in
an equal number of different actors and actresses. At each cor-
ner of every photo, four complex mental state descriptors, e.g.,
dispirited, bored, are printed, only one of which (the target
word) correctly identiﬁes the depicted person’s mental state, while
the others are included as foils. The test is scored by total-
ing the number of items (photographs) correctly identiﬁed by
the participant; therefore, the maximum total score is 36. In
the Italian version the internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha)
was 0.605. Test–retest reliability for the Eyes test, as measured
by intraclass correlation coefﬁcient, was 0.833 (95% conﬁdence
interval = 0.745 – 0.902).
The study of Vellante et al. (2013) conﬁrms the validity of the
Eyes test. Both internal consistency and test–retest stability were
good for the Italian version of the Eyes test.
In theEmotionAttributionTask (Blair andCipolotti, 2000). This
task assessed ability to represent the emotions of others. In this
task, the participant was presented with 58 short stories describing
an emotional situation and was required to provide an emotion
describing how the main character might feel in that situation.
The sentences were designed to elicit attributions of positive and
negative emotions. The task was scored according to the number
of correct attributions. For this test as well, validation studies are
lacking (Mazza et al., 2007).
The Basic Empathy Scale-Affective subscale (AE subscale, 11
items): measuring emotional congruence with another person’s
emotions. Example items included “I get caught up in other peo-
ple’s feelings easily.” Each item asks participants to express their
own degree of agreement on a 5-point, Likert-type scale, ranging
from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). Cronbach’s
alpha was 0.86 (Albiero et al., 2009).
COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE EMPATHY MEASURES
Multifaceted Empathy Test
To assess empathy multi-dimensionally, we administered the MET
(Dziobek et al., 2008), a measure of empathy that allows sepa-
rate assessments of cognitive and affective aspects of empathic
functioning. This test consists of a series of photographs that
depict people in emotionally charged situations. In these pic-
tures, taken from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS;
Lang, 1980), the stimuli show individuals feeling different emo-
tions: positive emotions (25 pictures that include emotions such as
happiness, positive surprise), negative emotions (25 pictures that
include emotions such as sadness, anger, disappointment).
Positive and negative emotions were presented in random
order. All the stimuli were displayed on a black screen. For each
picture the subjects were required to infer the emotional states
of the individuals shown in the image by selecting one of four
emotional state descriptors (cognitive empathy). To assess affec-
tive empathy, subjects rate their level of empathic concern for the
individuals displayed in the images on a 9-point Likert scale.
STATISTICAL METHODS
Mann–Whitney U test was used to analyse the level of signiﬁcance
of participants’ scores on First-order false belief task.
T-test analysis was used to test signiﬁcant differences between
groups (ASD and control group) in socio-demographic, mental-
izing (Advanced ToM and BES-cognitive subscale) and experience
sharing measures (Eyes Task, emotion attribution task, and
BES-affective subscale).
To evaluate the difference in MET performance between two
groups, a 2× 4 repeatedmeasure designwas used. The assumption
of normality of the outcome variable was assessed carrying out a
Kolmogorov–Smirnov non-parametric test. Restricted maximum
likelihood estimation (REML) and an unstructured correlation
have been used. Marginal effects have been calculated to getting
an estimation of the way the presence of ASD affects the scores
of each model predictor. The overall statistical signiﬁcance of the
model has been set at 0.05 level.
The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) software




The ASD group showed lower scores compared to the controls in
the Advanced ToM Task (T1,28 = −4.626; p = 0.0001), and in BES
cognitive subscale (T1,28 = −5.154; p = 0.0001).
In the First-order false belief task the groups differed signiﬁ-
cantly on the non-parametric Mann–Whitney U test (U = 86.5;
Z = −5.44; p = 0.0001). The percentage of correct scores in
Washing Machine and Cigarette Task was 25.8 and 45.2% for ASD,
whereas 100 and 80.8% for the controls, respectively.
Mentalizing performance scores (means and SD) are reported
in Table 1.
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EXPERIENCE SHARING MEASURES
Adolescents with ASD showed lower scores compared to the
control group in the Emotion Attribution Task total score
(T1,28 = −4.618; p = 0.001), with a signiﬁcant difference in neg-
ative emotions (T1,28 = −2.803; p = 0.011), but not in positive
emotions (T1,28 = −2.149; p = 0.068). Adolescents with ASD also
showed lower scores compared to the control group in the Eyes
Task (T1,28 = −3.142; p = 0.004), but no signiﬁcant differences
in BES affective subscale (T1,28 = −7.38; p = 0.322) were found.
Experience sharing performance scores (means and SD) are
reported in Table 1.
AFFECTIVE AND COGNITIVE EMPATHY MEASURES
Multifaceted Empathy Test
Normalized MET data were analyzed by a linear mixed model for
repeatedmeasure designwithREML.Analysis showed a signiﬁcant
group effect (z = −1.18 ± 0.18; p < 0.05).
Marginal effects analysis showed statistically signiﬁcant inter-
action between ASD and positive cognitive empathy (marginal
effect = −0.72 ± 0.18; p < 0.05) and between ASD and negative
cognitive empathy (marginal effect = −072 ± 0.19; p < 0.05).
Results showed no signiﬁcant difference between groups in
positive affective empathy (marginal effect = −0.18 ± 0.21;
p = 0.519). On the other hand, ASD and controls differed in neg-
ative affective empathy (marginal effect = −0.69 ± 0.22; p< 0.05;
see Table 2; Figure 1).
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to investigate the empathy dimensions
in a sample of adolescents with ASD. Speciﬁcally, in our research,
we examined the empathic abilities in an ASD group compared
Table 2 | Marginal effects of the linear mixed model for repeated
measure design with restricted maximum likelihood estimation
(REML) of two groups.
Group and group × emotion interaction
Subjects Group effect Marginal
effect
SE p
Controls 0.61 0.14 0.001
ASD −0.58 0.13 0.001
Group emotion interaction
Controls Positive cognitive 0.78 0.19 0.001
Negative cognitive 0.88 0.19 0.001
Positive affective 0.09 0.29 0.75
Negative affective 0.69 0.21 0.001
ASD Positive cognitive −0.72 0.18 0.001
Negative cognitive −0.72 0.19 0.001
Positive affective −0.18 0.28 0.52
Negative affective −0.69 0.21 0.001
The signiﬁcant results are highlighted by bold numbers.
FIGURE 1 | Marginal effects of the scores of adolescents with ASD and
Controls.
to normal controls, using a variety of assessment instruments,
both paper and pencil and a computerized task. Our data show
that adolescents with ASD have a deﬁcit in the cognitive empathy
dimension, but do not differ from controls in the affective empa-
thy dimension when other people express emotions with positive
valence. Their difﬁculty in empathizingwith the emotional experi-
ence of other people is linked to sharing of emotions with negative
valence.
Speciﬁcally, the results obtained in the paper and pencil
measures that investigate mentalizing abilities reveal that the ado-
lescents with ASD hardly interpret other people’s mental states
(First-order false belief and Advanced ToM Task) compared to
controls. The ASD group also have trouble understanding the
meaning of what other people are saying and doing, and they typi-
cally struggle to take the other person’s perspective (BES-cognitive
subscale).
The evaluation of mentalizing ability through false belief tasks
is a key element in investigating the mentalizing skills in indi-
viduals with ASD. Therefore, these data conﬁrm that ToM is
a core deﬁcit in ASD (Fletcher-Watson et al., 2014; Lai et al.,
2014), which links both to precursor skills, such as joint atten-
tion and emotion recognition, and to subsequent abilities such
as creating friendship and social inclusion. Instead, regarding the
sharing experience measures (involving affective empathy, shared
self-other representations and emotional contagion), adolescents
with ASD were able to empathize with the emotional experi-
ence of other people when the latter expressed emotion with a
positive valence. In contrast, they showed a deﬁcit in sharing neg-
ative emotions. Moreover, the ASD group were unable to share
other people’s emotions by observing their ocular region (Eyes
Task).
The results obtained in paper and pencil measures
were conﬁrmed by the computerized empathy task (MET,
Dziobek et al., 2008).
The analysis of affective and cognitive empathy measures eval-
uated through the MET, showed signiﬁcant differences between
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the adolescents with ASD and the control group in the cognitive
empathy dimension both when they had to understand and
recognize positive and negative emotions.
The cognitive empathic deﬁcits of individuals with ASD could
be due to a marked deﬁcit in the ability to understand and explain
the mental/emotional states of other people (Jones et al., 2010;
Hirvela and Helkama, 2011; Samson et al., 2012; Schwenck et al.,
2012; Lockwood et al., 2013).
As far as affective empathy is concerned, the ASD group do not
show difﬁculties in the degree of empathic concern when the emo-
tion is positive, whereas the difﬁculty is present when observing
emotional imageswithnegative valence. The adolescentswithASD
feel aroused and involved when others experience positive emo-
tions like the healthy subjects do. Therefore, our results obtained
in both measures (paper and pencil and the computerized task)
suggest that the ASD subjects showed a difﬁculty in cognitively
identifying the mental state of other people, regardless of the dif-
ferent emotions to which they had to respond; on the other hand,
the deﬁcit in affective empathy is linked to emotional valence.
Several studies suggest that the processing of negative emo-
tions is most difﬁcult for individuals with autism (Howard et al.,
2000; Ashwin et al., 2006; Corden et al., 2008; Wallace et al., 2008;
Humphreys et al., 2013). The role of emotion in autism is still being
debated. Ashwin et al. (2006) consider the difﬁculty of processing
negative emotions in subjects with ASD to be linked to an atypical
function and structure of the amygdala. In their study people with
ASD were less accurate on the emotion recognition task compared
to controls, but only for the negative basic emotions. This was
discussed in the light of similar ﬁndings from people with damage
to the amygdala. Based on our results, we assume that the impair-
ment of experience sharing or affective empathy in adolescents
with ASD is linked to their poor shared self-other representations
of negative emotions.
Blair (2008) has proposed that one of the key processes under-
pinning functional affective empathy is the recognition of other
people’s distress cues (i.e., fear and sadness). Past studies (Howard
et al., 2000; Blair, 2008) have shown that children and adolescents
with psychopathic tendencies have difﬁculties in recognizing neg-
ative facial and vocal expressions. Thus, it is not possible to speak
of impairment of the affective empathy dimension in adolescents
with ASD without considering the type of emotion to which the
subject responds. Emotional contagion for negative emotions of
other people (like sadness, distress, suffering, anger) is impor-
tant for adaptive social behavior. The lack of sharing experience
when other people have negative emotions, leads to a failure of
appropriate empathic behavior in adolescents with ASD.
Our results are important for the development of rehabilitation
interventions that help these individuals to improve their social
skills.
These results are in agreement with recent literature (Jones
et al., 2010; Baron-Cohen, 2011; Cox et al., 2012; Schwenck et al.,
2012; Lockwood et al., 2013). In particular, Baron-Cohen (2011)
shows that cognitive empathy is impaired but affective empathy
is not, in individuals with autism. On the contrary, in other
psychological conditions, such as psychopathic personality dis-
order (borderline personality disorder, narcissism, psychopathy),
an intact cognitive empathy and impaired affective empathy are
present (Baron-Cohen, 2011). The lack of affective empathy, but
not of cognitive empathy, seems be an important factor to promote
violent and aggressive behaviors.
In conclusion, empathy is a multidimensional construct and
requires three abilities: ﬁrst, the recognition of emotions in one-
self and other people via facial expressions, shown by the gaze or
behavior; second, the sharing of emotional states with others, i.e.,
the ability to experience similar emotions to other people while
being conscious that this is a simulation of the emotional feeling
and it is not one’s own emotion (Derntl et al., 2010) and ﬁnally
to take the perspective of another person, though the distinc-
tion between one’s self and other people remains intact (Decety
and Jackson, 2004). For this reason, it is important to use more
instruments that allow us to capture all aspects of empathy. Our
approach enabled a more detailed analysis of these empathic com-
petencies, also considering the role of emotions in the empathic
construct. We believe that this dissociation in cognitive and affec-
tive empathy is of importance for several psychiatric conditions
which show the empathic ability impairment, such as autism
spectrum disorder but also schizophrenia (Fujino et al., 2014) or
post-traumatic stress disorder (Mazza et al., 2013). Replication
with a larger sample of ASD subjects will be necessary to conﬁrm
the present ﬁndings.
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